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ABSTRACT
 Faced with planning mass relief campaigns in liberated Europe in the aftermath 
of the Second World War, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administra-
tion relied heavily on cheap supplies of skimmed milk from surplus production in 
northern Europe. The success of this approach swept aside more detailed planning 
around restoring national maternal and children’s health services. This reliance on 
mass feeding continued into the post-war years. UNICEF, the agency with the most 
substantial financial resources, continued this supply-driven approach despite growing 
reservations by nutritionists in its rival agencies —the UN Food and Agricultural 
Organization and the World Health Organization.
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 In 1943 Dr Martha Eliot, the medical director of the United States 
Children’s Bureau, urged those planning post war reconstruction of 
the occupied nations of Europe to remember that «In the mind of all 
peoples children symbolise the future (…) one of the most morale 
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building forces in rallying the support of the liberated and conquered 
people alike, and one of the most vital factors in restoring economic 
and political stability, will be the steps taken to feed, protect, and 
care for the children» (1). The Second World War had already meted 
out disastrous consequences for the health of civilian populations. 
Measures to improve the health of children were providing a crucial 
test of the British and American agencies planning post war recon-
struction —would the human resources and supplies be available and, 
as important, what influence would be given to medical views on the 
proper management of motherhood and the rearing of children?
 There were more lasting consequences. Eliot’s intervention was a 
shot in a long battle between United States government agencies over 
the shape and limits of post war reconstruction —should it take the 
form of temporary relief or was this a golden opportunity to «lay the 
foundations for national and international child health and welfare 
services in the post-war period»? (2). The programs that emerged out 
of the debate over post war reconstruction would help legitimate new 
forms of international action. Debates over immediate problems of crisis 
management were at the same time arguments over the institutional 
design of the social agencies to be established by the United Nations 
to ensure a lasting, secure and just peace. 
 The solutions proposed for the medical and social crises faced by 
children in liberated Europe set in place institutional structures that 
governed international health policies for the post war era. The starting 
point for this experiment in institutional design was the debates over 
nutrition and childhood initiated by the League of Nations Health 
Organization in the 1930s. These heavily influenced the work of the 
main Allied reconstruction agencies which in turn shaped the main 
United Nations agencies involved in public health.
(1) Children and the United Nations. Relief and rehabilitation program, prepared by the 
Children’s Bureau, US Department of Labor, October 1943. Martha Eliot Papers, 
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College, Cambridge MA, Box 51 folder 702.
(2) Children..., note 1.
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1. MODELS OF INTERVENTION IN THE INTERWAR YEARS
 Although specific attention to child health emerged strongly in 
the nineteenth century it was not until the early twentieth century 
that paediatrics merged as a distinct medical specialty, constructing 
childhood as a medical condition. This new speciality was marked by a 
debate over the «whole child» with the conceptualisation of the child as 
«an independent medical object» (3) subject to «repeated examinations 
of normality», in a way not experienced by any other age group. This 
conception, in turn, owed much to non-medical developments, child 
welfare as well as specifically medical advances in the understanding 
of the gastro-enteric diseases that were the single greatest causes of 
infant and child mortality in the early twentieth century (4). This shift 
in medical knowledge was mirrored in public health bureaucracies. 
Instead of being subsumed within a larger set of sanitary strategies, 
infant feeding and the problem of maternal health were identified 
as a distinct area of state concern, with a concerted push to redefine 
child welfare as predominantly a medical question (5). 
 Early twentieth century developments in maternal and child health 
involved not just recommendations on dietary standards, but building 
integrated networks of clinics and home visiting devoted to the health 
of infants. In the United States, for example, the problem of infant 
mortality was redefined from a problem of milk to one of motherhood 
itself – persuading women to follow scientifically devised dietary and 
health regimens covering pregnancy and child rearing. While European 
models broadened attention to the economic and social context of fa-
(3) VINER, Russell; GOLDEN, Janet. Children’s experiences of illness. In: R. Cooter; 
J. Pickstone (eds.), Medicine in the twentieth century, Amsterdam, Harwood, 2000, 
pp. 575-587 (pp.584, 586).
(4) KUNITZ, Stephen J. The historical roots and ideological functions of disease 
concepts in three primary care specialties. Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 1983, 
57, 412-432.
(5) MARKEL, Howard. For the welfare of children: the origins of the relationship 
between US public health workers and pediatricians. American Journal of Public 
Health, 2000, 90, 893-899.
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mily life, with targeted social as well as medical assistance programs, in 
the United States the resistance of the American Medical Association 
narrowed the focus of public health away from more comprehensive 
solutions (6).
 Two main policy frameworks emerged in the interwar years, each 
strongly inf luenced by the new science of nutrition. The first drew 
on the rapidly changing understanding of the basic physiological 
requirements for health —the discovery of the body’s requirements 
for vitamins, the complexity of amino acids and the significance of 
proteins as well as basic foods. The second drew on under-consumptio-
nist economic theory and the scandals of the destruction of food 
stocks during the Great Depression of the 1930s as trade barriers 
and the collapse of markets left consumers short of basic foods. 
The most striking of the League’s innovations was this attempt to 
unite economic and nutrition policies —the so-called «marriage of 
agriculture and nutrition». In 1938 the economist, F.L. McDougall, 
argued that 
 «there exists in every country of the world serious malnutrition 
which is due, in the main, to an inadequate consumption of protec-
tive foods, which is almost entirely the result of inability to buy, at 
present food prices, at the lower levels of income, a sufficiency of 
both energy and protective foods. Ignorance of nutritional values 
plays only a minor part in causing this widespread malnutrition. The 
solution was to lower the prices of basic energy foods, leaving more 
(6) MECKEL, Richard. Save the babies: American public health reform and the prevention 
of infant mortality, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990, pp. 220-223; 
APPLE, Rima. Reaching out to mothers: Public health and child welfare, Sheffield, 
EAHMH [European Association for the History of Medicine and Health Evening 
Lecture Series 5], 2002; MARKS, Lara. Metropolitan maternity: Maternal and infant 
welfare services in early twentieth century London, Amsterdam-Atlanta, Rodopi, 1996, 
pp. 245-259; MARLAND, Hilary. The medicalization of motherhood: Doctors and 
infant welfare in the Netherlands, 1901-1930. COMACCHIO, Cynthia R. «The 
infant soldier»: Early child welfare attempts in Ontario. Both in: Valerie Fildes, 
Lara Marks, Hilary Marland (eds.), Women and children first: International maternal 
and infant welfare 1870-1945, London, Routledge, 1992, pp.74-96, 97-120; APPLE, 
Rima, Mothers and medicine: A social history of infant feeding 1890-1950, Madison, 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1987, pp. 182-183.
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income for the protective, in general less traded foodstuffs. Ade-
quate nutrition could only be achieved by increasing buying power; 
free trade would achieve this by lowering the prices of agricultural 
produce» (7). 
 This union of the new science of nutrition with the reform of 
world commodity markets remained a major theme during the war 
years. In late 1943, Frank Boudreau, Director of the Milbank Fund, 
explained that a «sound nutrition policy» would increase international 
trade in foodstuffs and build international cooperation. «The adoption 
of sound food policies now, based on our knowledge of the science 
of nutrition, aimed at the promotion of public welfare, will do much 
to restore these tottering institutions and provide a common meeting 
ground for the nations of the world» (8). 
 The science of nutrition and the economics of trade were drawn 
together in the social medicine of the interwar years. In child health, 
this contraposed concentration on the narrower medical definitions of 
health with a concern for housing, labour conditions. The recognition 
that problems of nutrition were as much economic as medical 
questions was promoted by the Social Section of the League as well 
as the International Labour Organization, which played a key part in 
discussions on nutrition and social welfare. Voluntary organizations, 
such as the American Red Cross and the Save the Children Fund, 
emphasised that health was not a mere matter of physical hygiene, 
but also implied moral well-being (9). The work of the International 
(7) MCDOUGALL, F.L. Food and welfare: League of Nations studies of nutrition and 
national economic policy. Geneva Studies, 1938, 9, 9-35 (pp. 34-35); AYKROYD, 
W. R. Nutrition, Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1944, p. 29; TURNELL, Sean. 
F. L. McDougall: Eminence grise of Australian economic diplomacy. Australian 
Economic History Review. 2000, 40, 51-70.
(8) BOUDREAU, Frank. Social and economic implications of freedom from want of 
food. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 1943, 87, 126-132 (p. 130).
(9) WEINDLING, Paul. The role of international organizations in setting nutritional 
standards in the 1920s and 1930s. In: Harmke Kamminga, Andrew Cunningham 
(eds.), The science and culture of nutrition, 1840-1940, Amsterdam-Atlanta, Rodopi, 
1995, pp. 319-332; MILLER, Carol. The social section and advisory committee on 
social questions of the League of Nations; and ROOKE, Patricia T.; SCHNELL, 
Rudy L. «Uncramping child life» International children’s organizations, 1918-
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Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation encouraged moves to 
turn the advances of laboratory medicine into standardised public 
health strategies that could be applied in any national context (10).
 In paediatrics, in contrast, there was an emphasis on prescriptive 
models of «scientific feeding». Nutrition was treated less as the effects 
of the economic capacity of the family, but as a series of technical, 
educational problems requiring medical supervision of all aspects of 
infancy from conception through the first few years of life. A series of 
League of Nations Health Organization meetings of leading paediatricians 
and nutritionists established minimum nutritional standards at each 
stage of life. While there was a wide range of views on individual 
components of diets —and each meeting concluded with calls for a 
major set of research agendas— there was a consensus on the need for 
standardized approaches and medical control. A 1937 League Meeting 
proposed a standard scheme for infant feeding for each country, with 
only minor local variants, with strong medical supervision: «a complete 
ante-natal and post-natal control of every pregnant mother from as 
early a stage as possible in pregnancy, and a control of each child. 
There is no reason why this control should cease at the age of 12 or 
24 months. It should continue during pre-school age and school age». 
While this medical supervision would vary locally, «We ought, however, 
to fix a common scheme for the work. When scientific progress in infant 
feeding is sure, we physicians are responsible for the facts being put 
into practice for all children» (11). As scientific advances reinforced the 
1939. Both in: Paul Weindling (ed.), International health organisations and move-
ments 1918-1939, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 154-202; HUTCHINSON, 
John F. Promoting child health in the 1920s: International politics and the limits 
of humanitarianism. In: Esteban Rodríguez-Ocaña (ed.), The politics of the healthy 
life: An international perspective, Sheffield, European Association for the History 
of Medicine and Health, 2002, pp. 131-150.
(10) LOWY, Ilana; ZYLBERMAN, Patrick. Medicine as a social instrument: Rockefeller 
Foundation, 1913-45. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biology and Biomedical 
Science, 2000, 31, 365-379.
(11) LEREBOULLET, P. L’Alimentation dans la premiere année, ses bases et ses rè-
gles. Études sur Alimentation, League of Nations Health Organization, Geneva, 17 
November 1936, p. 2; M.M. Eliot, note to file, (December 1936). Eliot Papers, 
Box 41, folder 580.
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prescriptive approach of infant welfare to mothers, the respect given 
to their views receded, with a shift from «counsel to direction» (12).
 These tensions were played out within national health administrations 
—nowhere more than in the United States, where different approaches 
crystallized around the health care of mothers, infants and children 
and the new professions of paediatrics and social work. The Children’s 
Bureau of the United States Department of Labor was established as 
part of the high tide of Progressivism before the First World War. 
From the start the Bureau was concerned with the creation of health 
programs targeted at women and children, but its wider concerns with 
social programs meant that medical questions were always inserted in 
a broader framework driven by social and welfare workers. From 1924, 
under the leadership of Dr Martha May Eliot, a Harvard medical and 
public health graduate, the Bureau’s Division of Child and Maternal 
Health increased in status and public standing but even following 
her elevation to Assistant Director of the Bureau in 1934 it remained 
one section in a bureau focused on wider questions of work and 
family (13). 
 The existence of this distinct zone was always contested. The United 
States Public Health Service (USPHS) expanded from its origins in 
managing quarantine and marine hospital services, reflecting the wider 
scope of the federal government in the interwar years. Throughout the 
interwar years surgeons-general fought an unceasing battle to centralise 
all federal government medical services —including those run by the 
Children’s Bureau— under their own, medical control (14). From the 
start, the two agencies were in open conflict for control of children’s 
health services. The Bureau’s notion of the «whole child» saw health 
care as but one aspect in an integrated set of welfare programs. The 
Children’s Bureau had the advantage of a distinct bureaucratic location 
(in the Department of Labor) and a wide network of active supporters, 
(12) APPLE, Rima, Constructing mothers: Scientific motherhood in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Social History of Medicine. 1995, 8, 161-178 (p. 178).
(13) GORDON, Linda. Pitied but not entitled: Single mothers and the history of welfare, 
1890-1935, New York, Free Press, 1994, p. 267.
(14) LINDENMEYER, Kriste. «A Right to childhood» the US children’s Bureau and child 
welfare, 1912-46, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1997, pp. 55-56, 165-69.
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spanning party political divides and mobilized by a formidable set of 
political leaders. More important to its survival was its constituent 
model —its leading lights were all women and drew strong support 
from progressive women’s organizations nationally. This network had 
proved crucial in thwarting earlier attempts to curb the Bureau’s 
independence; it also provided an administrative rationale for a more 
integrated approach to the delivery of services to women (primarily 
in the capacity as mothers) and children (15). The PHS could count 
on the support of the medical profession, in particular the American 
Medical Association, despite their vituperative differences on other 
areas of health policy (16).
2.  INTERNATIONAL RELIEF AND POST WAR RECONSTRUCTION
 The debates over domestic maternal and child health moved to an 
international stage after the US entered the Second World War and 
took over leadership of planning for the relief of occupied Europe. 
The problems posed by post war relief and reconstruction provided 
the first real test for international action. Would the liberating forces 
need to actively rebuild economic (and medical) infrastructure, or was 
their role to be the provision of temporary relief through emergency 
supplies? The problems faced by children after years of shortages, in 
some cases malnutrition, as well as social dislocation loomed large 
in surveys of the tasks facing the allied powers after the defeat of 
Germany.
 The British-dominated Allied Committee on Post War Reconstruction 
Requirements (the Leith Ross Committee) had concentrated on planning 
the relief requirements of each occupied nation. Lacking procurement 
powers, the Committee’s plans were an artificial exercise, ignored by 
the military planners who were deciding Europe’s future. Soon after 
(15) LINDENMAYER, note 14, pp. 201-202.
(16) LADD-TAYLOR, Molly. «Why does Congress wish women and children to die?»: 
The rise and fall of public maternal and infant health care in the United States, 
1921-1929. In: Fildes; Marks; Marland (eds.), note 6, pp. 121-132; LINDENMAYER, 
note 14, pp. 165-170.
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entering the war, the American initiatives superseded the passive Leith 
Ross model. At the end of 1942 Roosevelt set up the Office of Foreign 
Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO), under Herbert Lehman, 
New York’s Democratic Party Governor (and strong supporter of the 
New Deal). Despite spending much of his time fighting bureaucratic 
battles for survival in Washington, Lehman developed a much more 
activist approach than his British rivals. OFRRO would do more than 
ship supplies, but should (he argued) plan and rebuild the shattered 
economies of liberated territories. The new agency proved a magnet for 
progressive reformers originally drawn to Washington by the New Deal 
who were finding the climate in Washington increasingly hostile. Where 
Leith Ross had concentrated on planning medical supplies, OFRRO’s 
health section —dominated by officers loaned from the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s International Health Division and the United States Public 
Health Service— was the most enthusiastic supporter of the activist 
model. Its first secretary was Selskar Gunn, a veteran Rockefeller man. 
Thomas Parran, the US Surgeon General (the head of the USPHS), had 
worked for Lehman in New York State before moving to Washington 
and became a prime architect of the new agency. The central position 
of the USPHS meant that the Children’s Bureau was initially excluded. 
Only after protests from Martha Eliot, using the Bureau’s network of 
supporters, was a separate sub-committee on maternity care and child 
health established with Eliot in the chair (17). 
 OFRRO asked the Children’s Bureau to produce a «clear-cut» 
scheme, «a plan that would deal in some detail with a broad and 
f lexible program that could be applied realistically in almost any 
(17) Meeting of public health and medical care Committee appointed by Governor Herbert 
H. Lehman, 4 January 1943. UNRRA Archives, UN Archives, New York, PAG-4/
1.3.1.5.0.0.:6; Commission on Children in Wartime (a body chaired by the social 
scientist Leonard Mayo and including most of the leading Children’s Bureau 
figures, including Eliot), Recommendations for the care of children in occupied territory, 
15 February, 1943. Eliot Papers, Box 51 Folder 700; Martha Eliot to Dr Henry 
Helmholz, 10 March 1943, National Archives of the United States (NA), College 
Park, MD, RG102 A1/Entry 6, file 22-2-1-1-2; The office of foreign relief and rehabili-
tation operations health program, n.d. [late 1943] Thomas Parran Papers, University 
of Pittsburgh Library, Pittsburgh PA, 90/F-14 Box 132 FF 1762 N-Q. pp 9-10.
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one of the countries» (18). The Bureau obliged, with detailed general 
plans and specific programs of relief for Italy, Yugoslavia, Albania 
and Greece (19). Eliot argued for a policy based on «fundamental 
principles and objectives which will lay the foundations for national 
and international child health and welfare services in the post war 
period». These foundations included recognition of the special needs 
of the mother and child to appropriate medical care, nutrition and 
clothing. The reconstruction of the family unit, «the right of every 
child to the security of family life», was the basis of successful public 
health. This would be achieved under medical direction —relief 
missions would include a child health team led by a paediatrician, 
with an obstetrician or nurse-midwife and social and welfare workers. 
Relief feeding —based on fortified milk— and medical care should all 
be administered through maternity and child health centres. A core 
proposition was that if «the supervision and practical management of 
medical relief were entrusted to skilled pediatricians, not only would 
these children receive excellent attention but the clinical material could 
serve for the elucidation of lessons of significance for all children of 
the future» (20).
  The Children’s Bureau had already developed some international 
programs in Latin America (from 1941) and Eliot had made a major 
survey of British wartime programs for children. Drawing on these 
observations, Eliot saw wartime food supply policy as a golden 
opportunity to impose scientifically supervised feeding programs. Post 
war programs, she argued, should also be driven by «Coordinated and 
comprehensive» planning for children, bringing together health and 
welfare workers (21). Relief work in the strict sense —the provision of 
adequate supplies—, was essential, but should be the lever to create 
(18) Eliot to Lenroot, 23 February 1943. Eliot Papers, Box 51 Folder 700.
(19) Outline for the preparation of material for the Office of Foreign Relief, April 1, 1943. 
Eliot Papers, Box 52, folder 704.
(20) [M. Eliot] General principles relating to maternal and child health and child welfare, 
(October 1943), Eliot Papers, Box 51, folder 702; WOLMAN, Irving J. The child 
in war. American Journal of the Medical Sciences, 1943, 205, 858-869 (p. 868).
(21) BRADBURY, Dorothy. Five decades of action for children. US Department of Health 
Education and Welfare, 1962, p. 72; Recommendations of the special Committee of 
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a broader infrastructure of mother and infant health. Her scheme 
drew on the Children’s Bureau’s own Emergency Maternity and 
Infant Care Program (EMIC), which used the war crisis to develop 
state-run clinics and medically supervised feeding programs for the 
wives of US servicemen (22). These domestic wartime programs were 
to be projected on an international scale. The stakes were high, as 
acceptance of international programs could increase the legitimacy 
of these temporary programs when they came under attack after 
peace.
 Relief work would focus on infant feeding programs, with the 
provision of cheap and reliable milk at its heart. From 1944 Eliot started 
sounding the alarm about the need for large reliable stocks of milk 
for infant feeding. The general medical aim of changing nutritional 
practices remained strong —Eliot’s correspondence was peppered with 
fears that «UNRRA would go into the feeding problem on the basis of 
present food customs instead of trying to improve food habits through 
relief» (23).
 The OFRRO model became the basis for a broader, multilateral 
planning agency, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA), established by a conference of allied powers 
at Atlantic City in November 1943. Lehman was appointed its first 
director, and most of his advisors and staff followed him. The bulk 
of UNRRA’s planning was around the question of relief supplies, and 
it assumed a massive task of transferring foodstuffs to the devastated 
economies of southern and Eastern Europe. Wilbur Sawyer, a veteran 
Rockefeller man, headed the health section’s Washington Office. He 
the Children’s Bureau Commission on children in wartime, 29 Jan 1943. Eliot Papers, 
Box 51 folder 700.
(22) OFRRO, Memorandum which the United States’ Children’s Bureau is technically equipped 
to prepare on request with respect to health and welfare programs for children and mothers 
in liberated territories, March 9 1943. Eliot Papers, Box 51, folder 700.
(23) LENROOT, Katherine. Memorandum of Interview with Mr George Radin, 6 April 1944. 
Eliot Papers, Box 52, folder 704; David Weintraub (Chief of Supply, UNRRA) 
to Combined Food Board, Washington DC 12 June 1945. Eliot Papers, Box 52, 
folder 702.
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was supported by a succession of highly effective British public health 
doctors in London directing European field operations (24).
 UNRRA has been left with a very poor image. Where it is even 
mentioned in histories of post-war reconstruction these accounts 
are usually coloured by its legion of critics — especially those who 
objected to its relief activities in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
It became a target of growing US Congressional resentment of the 
use of American aid money for multilateral projects that seemed 
increasingly out of tune with the objectives of American foreign 
policy. UNRRA also had a difficult internal structure —particularly 
its distinction between supply and «area» sides. The former dealt with 
the procurement and shipping of relief —the function most popular 
with recipients— the latter with the integration of relief with local 
conditions, looking particularly at the effects of relief on the revival 
of local economies. After a bitter struggle the supply side emerged 
dominant —planning was to be in commodity units, not based on 
the needs of local economies— with all the intervention that this 
implied (25). These difficulties were compounded by the limited 
geographical scope of the relief administration. Instead of managing 
the rebuilding of all the liberated territories, those with substantial 
foreign reserves, or greater political power and ambitions —the north 
east European nations, led by France, rejected the strings attached to 
UNRRA’s assistance. So, damned in northern Europe as an American 
Trojan horse and in the United States as a leftist, internationalist plot, 
its fate was sealed. With the death of Roosevelt in 1945, his successor, 
Harry S. Truman, moved to close UNRRA’s activities. Even so, UNRRA 
was able to work in Greece, Italy, the Balkans, Ethiopia and China, 
as well as managing the massive problem of displaced people and 
refugees. The scale of its aid was unprecedented. Almost half its supply 
(24) SAWYER, Wilbur A. Achievements of UNRRA as an international health organiza-
tion. American Journal of Public Health, 1947, 37, 41-43.
(25) SAWYER, Wilbur A. Functions of the health division at headquarters and the Staff 
needed, 8 October 1945, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/1.3.1.5.0.0.:1; PRICE, Harry B. 
Note on interview with Harlan Cleveland, 27 September 1952. In: Dennis Mer-
rill (ed.), Documentary history of the Truman presidency, Bethesda, MD, University 
Publishers of America, 1996, vol. 13, pp. 720-721.
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program was food aid, amounting to $1,236,018,700 from mid 1945 
until November 1947 (26).
 With these political shackles, UNRRA found it difficult to break 
from the constraints of a supply-oriented emergency relief organization. 
Most of its budget was absorbed in supplying food and other relief 
to devastated allied nations. Competing with the military for scarce 
commodities and shipping, it concentrated on purchasing surpluses 
(or donated unsaleable food) from the allied powers. Most of its 
work was in procurement and negotiating the complex shipping and 
commodity controls of the Combined Boards that regulated trans-
Atlantic shipping (27). 
 Milk became the symbol of UNRRA’s successes and failures. Milk 
provided an obvious and quick solution to feeding mothers and children 
in liberated Europe. The consumption of dried whole milk, more suitable 
for child nutrition, had been held back by its poor keeping quality as 
milk fats auto-oxidized, developing an unpalatable tallowy f lavour. New 
technologies for manufacture and packaging (gas-packing) increased 
its storage life and (to some extent) its palatability, even in the tropics. 
In the United States average annual production of dried whole milk 
increased from a pre-war annual average of just over 22 million pounds 
to almost 106 million pounds. Dried skim milk production dwarfed 
this, increasing from almost 428 million pounds to just under 559 
million pounds. Even before the war the surplus in skimmed milk 
solids posed a problem for the dairy industry, especially in the United 
States (28). When the war ended UNRRA filled the gap —using US 
aid money to purchase American surpluses. An emphasis on milk in 
infant and school feeding programs could be easily justified through 
the nutritional knowledge accumulated during the 1930s, especially in 
(26) WOODBRIDGE, George. UNRRA: The history of the United Nations Relief and Reha-
bilitation Administration, New York, Columbia University Press, 1950, 1, p. 409.
(27) ROSEN, S. McKee. The combined boards of the Second World War: An experiment in 
international administration, New York, Columbia University Press, 1951, pp. 165-
173.
(28) HUNZIKER, Otto Frederick, Condensed milk and milk powder prepared for factory, 
school and laboratory, 6th edition, Illinois, La Grange, 1946, pp. IX, 332-335.
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Europe, where emergency-feeding programs would soon be superseded 
as domestic industries recovered. But emergency milk feeding soon 
became a universal panacea. 
 The Rockefeller Foundation’s Health Commission for Europe 
had been active since 1940 and had sponsored (with the cooperation 
of British medical research agencies) a major dietary survey based 
in Oxford. Although the survey’s findings largely confirmed the 
success of British rationing policies in averting dietary deficiencies, it 
established a research-based model that was promoted as a solution to 
the problems to face the Allied forces in Europe. The Oxford survey 
team won Foundation support for the principle that «full use will 
be made of this newer knowledge of nutrition in planning post-war 
relief in Europe. Properly conducted clinical surveys of the state of 
nutrition in re-occupied territories should yield information of the 
greatest practical value». Mobile laboratories would ensure that relief 
policies were guided by «detailed surveys supported by laboratory 
evidence». The Rockefeller Health Commission funded and staffed 
two laboratories for work in the Netherlands in early 1945 (29).
 Under Sawyer’s leadership UNRRA was sympathetic to a laboratory 
science-led policy. However, despite ambitious early plans to shape food 
relief around the most modern nutritional theories, these advanced 
schemes were soon swamped by the political and commercial realities of 
the post war crisis. Plans were made for mobile nutrition laboratories, 
on the Oxford model, to build a picture of the nutritional health 
among populations receiving UNRRA food aid. A.P Meikeljohn, who 
had been in charge of the Oxford mobile teams, was appointed to head 
UNRRA’s Nutrition Section. A year into the job he complained that 
he lacked «sufficient staff for anything but a makeshift program» (30). 
In the absence of serious research, the f lood of milk continued. Even 
(29) Medical relief in Europe: Suggestions for the work of medical specialists in nutrition, [July 
1943]. Rockefeller Archive Center, Pocantico Hills, New York, RF RG700/B10/F62, 
Hugh Sinclair to Charles Leach, 15 February 1945, RF RG700/B10/F62.
(30) Meikeljohn to Neville Goodman, Programme for the nutrition section, European Re-
gional Office, for 1946, UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/2.0.6.0.:15 H100/1/3.
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sympathetic critics complained that UNRRA «swamped local initiative» 
with this deluge of short-term aid (31).
 The strong role of the Children’s Bureau in OFRRO was not 
repeated as easily in UNRRA. There was no distinct children’s health 
committee; child and infant feeding became part of the more general 
supply problem. In part this was a personnel problem. Even had the will 
been there, it proved difficult to find competent trained medical staff. 
Instead, the Children’s Bureau worked through the Standing Technical 
Committee on Welfare which attempted the far more difficult task 
of integrating child welfare and health work from outside the health 
service —in the eyes of UNRRA senior administrators «an unnecessary 
adjunct serving an ill-defined purpose» whose services were unwanted 
by the governments receiving UNRRA’s aid (32).
 UNRRA’s main lesson to the United Nations technical agencies 
that inherited its programs was that while supplies were always eagerly 
sought, experts and institution-builders were rarely welcome. One 
UNRRA official warned those planning a new international health 
organization that:
 «The present Central Health authorities clearly underestimate the 
value of international expert cooperation (…) The authorities are 
supply-minded. I think they have this much to justify their attitude: 
skilled advice is not enough for the achievement of a modern Public 
Health program which must be dependent upon skilled manufacture 
in an ever-increasing degree. I think that if an International Health 
Service is to be fully successful it must have connections with the 
world supply allocating boards. The word “priority” has probably 
become a permanent one in our vocabulary, and an International 
(31) PHILLIPS, Ralph et al. Assistance Fournie par la FAO à des Etats Membres à l’Aide 
du Fonds UNRRA, Rome, Food and Agriculture Organization, 1954, p. 53.
(32) UNRRA, Standing Committee on Welfare, Working Committee on Children, minutes, 26 
June 1946, NA, RG102 A1/Entry b file 22-2-1-4; Woodbridge, note 26, 2, pp 27-
28.
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Health Organization that had the power of recommending priorities 
would immensely gain prestige» (33). 
 Andrew Topping, the director of UNRRA European health work, 
admitted that for most recipients «the presence of our experts has 
been the price they have to pay for UNRRA supplies» (34). 
3. INTERNATIONAL HEALTH AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIO-
NAL DESIGN
 Increasingly debate over the future of international health policies 
became enmeshed in the claims of rival organizations. The collapse or 
discrediting of the pre-war organizations left the way open for a new 
set of approaches, led by the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO). Formed at the Hot Springs, Virginia conference 
in May 1943, it became the first United Nations agency —but with 
much strong continuity with the Geneva models of the League. This 
was not surprising, as F.L. McDougall was one of its main initiators. 
FAO was given a strong nutrition division, headed by W.A. Aykroyd, 
formerly of the League and most recently working in India. This was 
underlined by the appointment of the nutritional scientist Sir John 
Boyd Orr as founding director general. The new organization was de-
dicated to improving world agriculture, forestry and fisheries, but its 
founders saw these production aims as part of a more general welfare 
objective —to end hunger and raise general standards of nutrition. 
Aykroyd argued «FAO is in a sense an offshoot of the modern scien-
ce of nutrition and should not be cut off from its roots… It should 
avoid the possibility of being regarded by the public as primarily a 
trade or business organization» —and should not bow out of the field 
when the new International Health Organization is established (35). 
(33) K.W.C. Sinclair-Loutit to Neville Goodman, 19 September 1946 UNRRA Archives, 
PAG4/1.3.1.5.0.0.:10.
(34) TOPPING, Andrew. Memorandum on the «Run-down» of the health division, 22 July 
1946. UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/2.0.6.0.:24.
(35) AYKROYD, W.A. Suggested organization and functions of the food and nutrition De-
partment of an International Office of food and agriculture, dated (1946?) in pencil, 
JAMES A. GILLESPIE 
DYNAMIS. Acta Hisp. Med. Sci. Hist. Illus. 2003, 23, 115-142.
130 International organizations and the problem of child health, 1945-1960
DYNAMIS. Acta Hisp. Med. Sci. Hist. Illus. 2003, 23, 115-142
131
In 1946, FAO underlined its continuity with the Geneva program and 
made a strong statement of its faith in concerted planning to increase 
world trade and overcome nutritional shortfalls. National planning 
of nutritional targets would be combined with increased agricultural 
production with freer international trade and increased productivity. 
The successes of wartime planning led to hopes for a new era of in-
ternational planning (36). To achieve this, FAO’s early objectives were 
tied closely to building up each nation’s infrastructure: reviving the 
national nutrition committees set up under League auspices, developing 
school feeding and nutritional education programs: and building «an 
effective group of nutrition workers» in each country, especially those 
suffering from under-development (37). 
 The highpoint of UNRRA’s activities coincided with the planning 
of a new world health organization. Many of UNRRA’s supporters had 
seen it as the embryonic form of the new institution —its field progra-
ms consciously developed to maintain the Rockefeller Foundation and 
League of Nations tradition of active intervention. By 1946, however, 
UNRRA’s ambitions were destroyed by the Cold War. The initial plans 
for a new World Health Organization were kept firmly in the hands 
of senior public health officials, anxious to block the emergence of 
a rival authority. In its planning phase WHO showed little interest in 
program areas such as the health of children. 
 Formal planning of the new international organization began when 
a small technical committee met in Paris in April 1946. The agenda 
constructed by Parran and the Chief Medical Officer of the British 
Ministry of Health, Wilson Jameson, set modest goals —openly repu-
diating the interventionist approach associated with the League of 
Nations Health Organization. Ludwik Rajchman, its founding director 
was pointedly not invited to Paris and his submission calling for a very 
independent international organization was ignored. The treatment 
but reads as if completed earlier, most likely 1943, FAO Archives, Rome, RG57.1 
Series D1.
(36) FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS. 
World Food Survey, Washington DC, FAO, 1947, pp. 11-18, 26-29.
(37) AYKROYD, W.A. Objectives of the nutrition division, 1 November 1948., FAO Archives, 
RG57.1 series C2.
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of child and maternal health became a litmus test for the acceptance 
of interventionist policies. The drafts of Parran and Wilson allowed 
no scope for the new organization to become involved in questions of 
maternal and child health —the type of interference that had irrita-
ted national health officials in the interwar years. Despite Rajchman’s 
absence, this was not left unchallenged. The French members, Xavier 
Leclainche and Andre Cavaillon, the leftist minister for health in 
De Gaulle’s provisional government, proposed as an objective «the 
health protection of maternity and infancy» (38). This became part 
of a general attack on the Anglo-American attempt to stif le the new 
organization, an argument for a universal public health, rather than 
«hygiene» institution —going right to the heart of medical practice, 
the work of physicians, hospitals and medical research. Faced with 
strong criticism from the Europeans, Parran and Wilson accepted a 
compromise from Brock Chisholm, a Canadian psychiatrist (soon to 
become the first director general of WHO, partly because of his success 
in defusing these battles). His wording was characteristically vague: 
«The healthy development of the child towards world citizenship is 
of paramount importance» (39). The final draft approved by the UN 
Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) firmed the objective «to 
promote maternal and child health welfare» (40).
  The World Health Conference in New York in July accepted and 
expanded Chisholm’s rather waff ly ideas about mental well-being 
—their very vagueness made them difficult to contest openly (41). 
(38) CAVAILLON, A.; LECLAINCHE, X. Proposal for an international convention 
establishing the international health organization, 19 March 1946. In: Minutes of 
technical preparatory Committee for the International Health Conference, Paris 18 March 
to 5 April 1946, New York, World Health Organization (Interim Commission), 
1947, p. 50.
(39) Draft of «Preamble» to the Convention of the World Health Organization, 21 March 
1946, note 38, p. 61.
(40) «Proposals for the Constitution of the World Health Organization» (submitted to 
UN ECOSOC), p. 70; CAVAILLON, A. in Procès Verbal (draft minutes) Technical 
Preparatory Conference, 19 March, 1946, WHO Library, Geneva, p. 4.
(41) Summary Report on Proceedings, Minutes and Final Acts of the International 
Health Conference held in New York from 19 June to 22 July 1946. Official Re-
cords of the World Health Organization. 2, New York and Geneva, WHO (IC) June 
1948, pp. 46-47.
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It also expanded the Technical Planning Committee’s objective to: 
«promote maternal and child health and welfare» to Boudreau’s more 
ambitious: «to promote maternal and child health and welfare and to 
take such measures as will foster harmonious living in a changing total 
environment, which is essential for the healthy development of the 
child» (42). This caused sharp divisions in the US delegation, reviving 
the old battle between the Public Health Service and Children’s Bureau 
(represented by Parran, the delegation chairman, and Martha Eliot, 
his deputy). Eliot later recalled that the USPHS objections went back 
to its interests, historically «centered in communicable disease and the 
environment in which they grew, [the USPHS representatives] felt that 
this statement in the Preamble was too broad, I think, and they also 
objected to the focus being on children as such» (43). Parran’s objec-
tions were over ruled and WHO seemed armed with a straightforward 
commitment to develop programs in maternal and child health and 
welfare.
4. UNICEF AND SUPPLY DRIVEN POLICY
 These ambitions soon vanished as the new organization stru-
ggled for acceptance. With an interim commission dependent on 
grants from UNRRA (tied to the continuation of existing UNRRA 
programs) and loans from the United Nations, WHO was unable to 
develop its own agenda. FAO and WHO (IC) initially co-operated, 
in the expectation of drawing a considerable amount of the reserve 
funds left over from UNRRA. In 1948 they requested $10 million 
to address the world food crisis. Their expectation that they would 
inherit UNRRA’s surplus (amounting to about 35 million dollars) and 
dominate future aid money was dealt an unpleasant blow (44). The 
(42) Note 41, p. 49.
(43) Interviews with Martha May Eliot, November 1973-May 1974. Schlesinger-Rock-
efeller Oral History Project, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College, Cambridge 
Mass, p.184.
(44) WHO and FAO, Proposal for a joint action programme to increase world food production 
and raise standards of health, [Presented to Central Committee, UNRRA, Septem-
ber 1948], WHO Archives, Geneva, WHO1/803/1/3; WOODBRIDGE, note 26, 
p. 307.
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entire surplus was granted to a new agency to handle the emergency 
needs of children. Rajchman, representing the Polish government 
on UNRRA’s Council, warned of the crisis facing Europe’s children 
in the coming winter, and persuaded his colleagues to devote their 
residual funds to an emergency children’s fund. His opponents were 
left wrong-footed, lacking realistic alternative programs of their 
own. Rajchman’s new organization, the United Nation’s Emergency 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), was planned to have a limited life, but 
its resources vastly outweighed the new technical agencies. With 
the start from the UNRRA funds, UNICEF also found fundraising 
from governments easy —relief of children was seen as inherently 
non-political. In its f irst year the Fund raised an additional $30 mi-
llion, mainly in government contributions. By comparison, the WHO 
(IC) relied upon a loan of $1 million from the UN, a further $1 
million granted by UNRRA was clawed back, and offered to WHO 
only on condition that it must be spent on programs approved by 
UNICEF (45).
 Although UNICEF was required to seek the technical advice of WHO 
and FAO, its financial dominance —and Rajchman’s strong interests in 
health policy— gave it a dominant role in post war international health 
programs. Working with the Scandinavian Red Cross, UNICEF set up 
mass tuberculosis immunization programs, using BCG vaccine —still 
controversial in British and American health circles (46). In a pattern 
to repeat itself, WHO was faced with the choice of developing its own 
approach to tuberculosis —but with no funding— or reluctantly join 
UNICEF’s as technical adviser, on terms set by the Fund. It had little 
choice, and became an active participant in the BCG mass vaccination 
campaign.
(45) Report of meeting of the Program Committee of the international children’s emergency 
fund, November 4, 1947. Eliot Papers, Box 52 folder 712; Note by the director 
general of WHO on the UNRRA $1,000,000 grant to WHO, Joint Committee on 
Health Policy UNICEF/WHO, 27 May 1950, UNICEF Archives, New York, JC4/
UNICEF-WHO/5.
(46) BALINSKA, Marta. For the good of humanity: Ludwik Rajchman medical statesman, 
Budapest, Central European University Press, 1998, pp. 211-214.
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 In July 1947 UNICEF took advantage of the presence in the Uni-
ted States of eminent European paediatricians at the first big post 
war International Paediatrics Conference in New York to assemble a 
joint FAO-WHO (IC) Committee to make recommendations on child 
nutrition. The joint committee presented a dismal picture of the state 
of Europe’s children entering the third winter of peace. The report 
was dominated by UNICEF’s emergency feeding agenda, emphasizing 
the need to make large supplies of animal protein, especially milk, 
available. Its recommendations did not go beyond the constituents of 
supplementary feeding programs (47). 
 UNICEF had started as a relief agency, distributing milk and 
other foods to children, especially through schools. As the European 
emergency died down, these programs were extended to other areas 
of the world. From 1947 UNICEF took over UNRRA’s role as the lar-
gest purchaser of US surplus dried milk, much of it purchased with 
American aid money. During the late 1940s and through the 1950s 
almost a quarter of its annual budget was expended on dry skimmed 
milk (48). Supplies of cheap milk had created the basis for UNICEF’s 
reliance on milk in its nutritional programs. The FAO Nutrition Divi-
sion noted in 1949: 
 «This is a fairly clear-cut food commodity problem with many 
of the familiar aspects of such problems: need for a valuable food: 
potentialities for increased production; and unbridged gap between 
producers and consumers in need (…) The US government, in su-
(47) FAO and WHO (IC) Report on child nutrition, (prepared for UNICEF), Washington, 
UNICEF, 1947.
(48) FAO, WHO and UNICEF. Dry milk production, New York, UNICEF, 1959, p. 7; see 
Ruxin’s estimate that nutrition occupied only a small part of UNICEF’s early pro-
gram, RUXIN, Joshua Nalibow. Hunger science and politics: FAO, WHO and UNICEF 
nutrition policies, 1945-1978, London, University College of London [unpublished 
PhD thesis], 1996, pp. 62-63. The basis of this judgment is difficult to decipher, 
especially as much of the US milk was effectively free. UNICEF’s commitment to 
Asian projects, however, was more rhetoric than real during the 1950s.
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pplying funds to UNICEF for the purchase of dried skimmed milk, 
has in effect been creating a market for its own farmers» (49). 
 The hand of the US Department of Agriculture was seen behind 
US support for UNICEF —while the Department of State had sym-
pathised with FAO’s projects of broader programs for the continuing 
needs of children, Agriculture, worried about the disposal of surpluses, 
continued support for the UNICEF feeding programs (50).
 Differences soon appeared over UNICEF’s concentration on milk as 
the core of the nutrition problem. Aykroyd later noted, «It was found, 
however, that the mere distribution of supplementary foods did not 
provide a satisfactory basis for a long-term program to improve child 
nutrition. As a result, UNICEF undertook its milk conservancy program 
in collaboration with FAO, with the object of replacing imported milk 
in due course by local milk of good quality». Milk conservancy progra-
ms, in turn, proved limited as many countries lack the basic ability to 
produce adequate milk. This in turn led to the pursuit of alternative 
sources of protein —a quest that again abandoned the study of local 
diets in a search for a universal and ultimately elusive panacea (51). 
 FAO confronted this problem at a conference of nutritional wor-
kers at Baguio in the Philippines. The Baguio conference underlined 
the irrelevance of milk as a solution to malnutrition in much of Asia. 
Aykroyd concluded that «child feeding programs in under-developed 
countries must be largely based on locally-produced foods», openly 
criticising the milk-based demonstration projects run by UNICEF in 
the Far East (52). He added that:
(49) [AYKROYD] Note on the continuation of UNICEF activities, 15 August 1949. FAO 
ARCHIVES, RG57.0 Series D2.
(50) AUTRET, M. Memo to Aykroyd, relations FAO-UNICEF, 2 August 1950., FAO Archives, 
RG12, Nutrition division Dr M. Autret Subject Files, Box 1, file: correspondences 
1950-55.
(51) Aykroyd to E.J.R. Heyward (UNICEF), 24 February 1956, UNICEF Archives, Ac-
cession 62A-620, Box T041 Folder A678: Program Division.
(52) SCOTT, Marjorie L. International aspects of child feeding. American Journal of 
Public Health, 1949, 39, 1517-1521; [AYKROYD] note 49.
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«The anticipated surpluses in dried milk could (…) be used as a 
basis for child feeding programs in many countries where the local 
dairy industry could at the same time be developed. However, some 
countries where a need for child feeding programs is particularly 
great offer few, if any, potentialities for promoting dairy production 
and have insufficient economic resources to continue importation 
of dried milk after outside assistance is withdrawn. This is true, for 
example, in most countries of the Far East where under- and malnutri-
tion are very prevalent. Here programs along the line recommended 
by the Baguio Nutrition Committee (…) could advantageously be 
developed. It would seem very unfortunate if future activities were 
confined to areas where the dairy industry could be developed to 
the stage of self-sufficiency as in the case of UNICEF’s European 
Program and which, I gather, is Mr Hayward [UNICEF’s deputy 
director]’s idea» (53).
 Aykroyd took this critique further over the following year, savage-
ly attacking UNICEF’s Haitian child feeding program, a practice of 
«supplying dried skim milk to countries without relating the supple-
mentary feeding to a properly considered nutrition program. To call 
the importation and distribution of free food “the establishment of a 
nutrition service” is certainly alien to our ideas» (54). 
 Another source of dissent came from Martha Eliot. The end of 
the war saw the closure of the Children’s Bureau’s EMIC program and 
in the hostile atmosphere of Cold War America Eliot turned again to 
international activities. Moving beyond criticisms of UNICEF’s milk 
fetish, Martha Eliot led an attempt to develop her earlier project for 
co-ordinated maternal and child health projects. In 1949 Eliot mo-
ved to Geneva as WHO’s deputy director (55). She chaired an Expert 
Committee on Maternal and Child Health that called on UNICEF to 
shift its resources from emergency feeding to assist nations to develop 
infrastructure (led by paediatricians) to put child health on a scientific 
(53) Aykroyd to F.W. Clements, 2 August 1949. FAO Archives, RG 57.1 Series A2.
(54) Aykroyd to A.J. Wakefield, Resident representative of the Secretary-General to 
UN, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 2 August 1950. FAO Archives, RG57.1 Series A2.
(55) TERRELL, Mary Helen. «Some kind of social doctor». Historical Study of Martha May 
Eliot. Brandeis University [Unpublished Ph.D. thesis], 1990, p. 279.
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basis (56). Although these conclusions were resoundingly ignored, under 
her leadership, WHO continued to warn of the dangers of relying on 
milk-based relief that stimulated demand and reshaped preferences in 
directions that could never be satisfied from local production. This 
remained a theme at WHO, even after Eliot resigned in 1951. A WHO 
report by B. D. Jelliffe raised great ire at UNICEF headquarters, as it 
attacked the lack of interest in local food habits. Educational efforts 
were singled out: «an over preoccupation with milk distribution has 
a bad effect on [the mothers attending MCH centres] during an im-
pressionable period, so that they often acquire the view that animal 
milk is absolutely necessary for infant feeding and fail to realise the 
overwhelming importance of making every effort to use local methods 
and available food to better advantage» (57). 
 In 1954 WHO took this further, calling for an end to milk distri-
bution through maternal and child health centres «because experience 
has shown that this interferes with the most important functions of 
these centres, i.e. the education of the parents in the ways and means 
of achieving health by their own efforts». Greater stress should be pla-
ced on locating and developing adequate foods already in local use. 
«Time spent distributing milk is time taken away from this long term 
solution of the nutritional problems of the growing child» (58). Others, 
such as the nutritional scientist, B.S. Platt, attacked the manner cheap 
skimmed milk was undermining campaigns to explain the superiority 
of breast feeding (59). 
 As criticism from the technical agencies mounted, new sources of 
supply entrenched UNICEF’s emergency feeding model. The Truman 
(56) WHO. Expert Committee on maternal and child health, 1st Session, January 
1949. WHO Official Records. 19, p. 43.
(57) JELLIFFE, B.D. Observations on the use of UNICEF dried milk in infant feeding in 
some tropical countries, 29 December 1953. WHO Archives, WHO2/FN8. 
(58) UNICEF-WHO Joint Committee on health policy, seventh aession, Suggestions 
regarding future activities in the prevention of malnutrition in infants and young chil-
dren, note by the Secretariat of the World Health Organization, 13 April 1954. UNICEF 
Archives, JC7/UNICEF-WHO/5.
(59) PLATT, B.S. Infant feeding practices: Breast feeding and the prevention of infant 
malnutrition. Proceedings of the Nutrition Society, 1954, 13, 94-105 (p. 95).
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administration’s Point Four aid program released greater resources, 
but within tight constraints set by US economic and political interests. 
This coincided with a debate about the abolition of UNICEF. With the 
passing of the European crisis that had given birth to the Emergency 
Fund, discussions raged over its future. WHO drew strong support from 
the US Department of State for its campaign for immediate abolition 
of its rival. The Department of Agriculture, however, helped rescue 
UNICEF. In 1950 it sold $13 million of milk (about one third of the 
US surplus) to UNICEF for $3 million, enabling the embattled agency 
to expand its feeding operations in the Far East (60). In the 1950s the 
United States continued to expand its food aid programs —through 
the Public Law 480 «Food for Peace» program— at little or no cost. 
UNICEF’s main expense was freight. The attempt to balance humani-
tarian, political and commercial objectives was a difficult one, when 
conflicts arose, it was commercial calculations that usually prevailed; 
the program was driven by American domestic politics (61). 
 FAO’s Nutrition Division had been sympathetic to the continuation 
of UNICEF as the UN system provided no other focus for «substantial 
and continuing international action on behalf of children» (62). This 
support remained tempered by doubts over the Fund’s reluctance to 
listen to other agencies. As the focus of international aid gradually 
shifted to under-developed countries outside Europe in the 1950s FAO’s 
enthusiasm for «local foods», its warning that outside Europe «milk 
distribution is for treatment of a few cases (…) for treatment milk will 
(60) LENROOT, K. Notes for Conference on continuing needs of children, 4 January 1950. 
NA, RG59 lot file 55D429, Box 17. Department of State: Subject files of Durward 
V. Sandifer, 1944-1954.
(61) KAUFMAN, Burton. Trade and aid: Eisenhower’s foreign economic policy 1957-6, Bal-
timore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, pp. 28-29, 150; HALL, Lana. U.S. 
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J.C.Super; T.C. Wright (eds.), Food, politics and society in Latin America, Lincoln, 
University of Nebraska Press, 1985, pp. 133-141; DOUGHTY, Paul. The food game 
in Latin America. In: D.E. McMillan (ed.), Anthropology and food policy: Human 
dimensions of food policy in Africa and Latin America, Athens, University of Georgia 
Press, 1991, pp. 147-156. 
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always be a drug more than a food» had greater meaning (63). Aykroyd 
and his colleagues argued that «The emphasis given to dried milk in 
UNICEF programs is in part related to the supplies available to UNI-
CEF» (64). A FAO critic noted in the mid 50s, «There is no analysis 
of what sort of set-up would be most appropriate for the country, but 
some ideas are formulated in UNICEF Headquarters and then put 
before the Governments concerned» (65).
5. CONCLUSION
 When change came it was not as a result of scientific criticism but 
from a crisis in supplies. In 1959 both the United and Canada ceased 
donations of skimmed milk powder to international food programs, as 
commercial export demand for these products now exceeded supply. 
The post war surplus had finally dried up and UNICEF’s Executive 
Board was forced to ask its field offices for advice on new directio-
ns (66).
 Paradoxically, this did not immediately lead to a rethinking of 
the emergency feeding model. As UNICEF’s approach hit financial 
and supply problems, FAO and WHO were embracing new scientific 
understandings of malnutrition, derived from studies of kwashiorkor 
in Africa and Central America, which identified the disease as resul-
ting from protein deficiency. Autret and Béhar’s study, based on the 
research of the Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama 
(INCAP) in Guatemala, became the new FAO and WHO orthodoxy, 
(63) M. Autret, Report on FAO-WHO-UNICEF Meeting, Paris 20-21st April 1953, FAO 
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with a renewed acceptance of the efficacy of the UNICEF program 
of free milk to educate the population, coupled with FAO projects to 
develop local dairy industries or alternative high protein food, such as 
fish f lour (67). Like the UNRRA and UNICEF feeding programs of the 
1940s this orthodoxy was based on a disease model —prioritising the 
search for specific causes of particular (often extreme) manifestations 
of malnutrition. It perpetuated the neglect of approaches to maternal 
and child health that took physiological health as but one aspect of 
child welfare.
 Even so, the end of cheap supplies forced rethinking within UNI-
CEF. In 1960 the Fund quietly dropped its logo of a child holding a 
cup of milk (68). In 1965 Richard Heyward, UNICEF’s deputy director, 
wrote a searching and self-critical assessment of UNICEF’s policies. He 
quoted Indonesia’s President Sukarno: «What is UNICEF? It is powde-
red milk». Heyward laid blame on the lingering idea that «UNICEF 
should concentrate on supplying imports, rather than using grant-in-aid 
more generally to help the strategic elements in a country’s program 
from the point of view of children». These problems could be traced 
to UNICEF’s origins as UNRRA’s temporary successor. As an agency 
set up to provide emergency relief «the countries being served were 
in no mood to support long and careful studies by international or-
ganizations (…) They wanted simple, practical help» (69). 
 The emergency measures put quickly in place in parts of liberated 
Europe during the closing stages of the Second World War had long 
term consequences, framing much of the vision of health than guided 
post war planners —even when they shifted their attention to less de-
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veloped parts of the world (70). UNICEF’s continuation of UNRRA’s 
role as a supply agency, supplemented by United States aid programs, 
became driving forces shaping international health priorities. Despite 
the efforts of Martha Eliot and her colleagues on the WHO Expert 
Committee on Maternal and Child Health the focus remained on the 
providing cheap and effective food supplements. Broader social and 
public health contexts had been lost. Any analysis of the formation of 
international health policy needs to move beyond rational models that 
assume a «logical selection based on global burden and the availabi-
lity of cost effective interventions» (71). The problems of institutional 
design —the role of interest groups, of conflicts between and within 
sponsoring governments— are as important as scientific debates on 
appropriate forms of treatment.
(70) This suggests a need to be cautious about approaches that assume international 
health policies in developing nations were simply continuations of «colonial 
medicine» as set out in PACKARD, Randall. Visions of postwar health and de-
velopment and their impact on public health interventions in the developing 
world. In: Frederick Cooper; Randall Packard (eds.), International development 
and the social sciences, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997, pp. 93-118. 
Even the WHO/UNICEF malaria eradication campaign, on which Packard bases 
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in Italy and Greece in the 1940s.
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